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The communal nature of the judicial systems in
early medieval Norway1
Alexandra Sanmark
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the significance of the communal elements
present in the judicial systems in early medieval Norway, elements that have hith-
erto been almost completely ignored by scholars. The expression ‘communal nature’
is used in order to highlight two different aspects of this: the communal legal re-
sponsibility as well as the communal judicial procedure. The study will focus on the
three earliest Norwegian laws; i.e. the older laws of the Gulathing and the
Frostathing, as well as the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter (‘Lawmender’).2 The
majority of the regulations included in this study concern the thing organisation and
‘personal rights’.3
Introduction
Previous research regarding the communal and individual aspects of pre-Christian
and early medieval society has to great extent focused of the emergence of the indi-
vidual, particularly in connection to state formation in Norway.4 These issues will
thus be only partly considered in this article. The main focus will instead be placed
on the communal elements, which were present in many significant aspects, such as
the issuing of verdicts and the concepts of guilt and punishment. As pointed out by
other scholars, the degree and frequency of these elements were gradually reduced
over time. The clearest break is seen in the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter. By this
time, the position of the king had grown strong enough for him to take charge of the
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2 The older laws of the Borgarthing and the Eidsivathing are not used in this article, since
only the ecclesiastical regulations are still extant.
3 Larson 1935: 120-49, 222-24 and 257-82; Taranger 1962: 5-16 and 43-71.
4 Sigurðsson 1999: 137-39 and 178-80; Bagge 2001b: 366-70; cf. Berge 2002: 47.
legal system.5 It was therefore not until this time, i.e. nearly 300 years after the in-
troduction of Christianity, that a judicial system almost fully based on the decisions
and actions of individuals had emerged. It must on the other hand be emphasised
that there is very little evidence to show whether the regulations in these laws were
actually enforced. It can however be argued that the judicial system reflected the
contemporary thinking in society.
The nature of the Norwegian provincial laws
Before going into the details of the changing judicial systems, the nature of the laws
themselves needs to be discussed. This is likely to be common knowledge for read-
ers familiar with the Scandinavian languages. However, for the benefit of those read-
ers who are not, a brief outline of the origin and dating of the early Norwegian
medieval laws will here be given. This is of particular importance as these topics
have been subject to much debate over time. For the purposes of this article, it will
suffice to provide an approximate date for when the extant laws were written down
and to show that they contain regulations from various time periods. It is clear that
the year of the manuscripts cannot be used to date either the individual regulations
or the law as a whole.6
The Law of the Gulathing has survived in a number of manuscripts. The oldest
complete version is the so-called Codex Rantzovianus, which has been dated to c.
1250.7 Parts of this law have also been found in three older fragments. All scholars
agree that these three fragments date from before 1250. The single regulations seem
to derive from a rather wide time-span. Martina Stein-Wilkeshuis has compared three
tenth-century treaties between the Rus and the Greek described in the Nestor’s
Chronicle and found that certain practices have ‘direct counterparts’ in early Nordic
provincial laws. Stefan Brink has pointed out that if this interpretation is correct, it
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briefly discussed, see e.g. Sigurðsson 1999: 137-38; Bagge 2001b: 366-70. Steinar Imsen has
drawn attention to the ‘communal rule’ and ‘communalism’ of the bǿndr from the time of
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is possible to trace elements in these laws ‘back to as early as c. 900 AD’.8 Anne Irene
Riisøy has furthermore argued that some of the laws concerning women’s sexuality
included in the ecclesiastical regulations in the Norwegian provincial laws may date
back to the Viking Age.9
Other regulations in the Law of the Gulathing seem to date from the eleventh and
twelfth centuries. In extant versions of this law, some sections are attributed to
‘Olav’, some to ‘Magnus’, and some to ‘both’, i.e. Olav and Magnus. ‘Magnus’ is
seen to refer to King Magnus Erlingsson (1161-84), who revised the Gulathing law,
presumably in 1163/64. Knut Helle has, through comparative studies, identified some
of the chapters that most likely were introduced at this time.10 Most scholars agree
that ‘Olav’ refers to King Olav Haraldsson (Olav the Holy, 1016-30). The division
of the text into sections attributed to ‘Olav’ and ‘Magnus’ respectively was most
likely a result of the 1163/64 revision. By this time, it had become necessary to dis-
tinguish between the regulations introduced by the two kings. Although it seems
clear that Olav Haraldsson did introduce some of the regulations attributed to ‘Olav’,
he probably did not issue all of these. Knut Helle has thus argued that the only cer-
tain thing that can be said is that they must predate King Magnus’ revision.11 Thus,
many regulations in the Law of the Gulathing seem to date from either before, or
around, 1163/64. It must however be kept in mind that the oldest complete extant
manuscript, the Codex Rantzovianus, has been dated to c. 1250 and that, up to this
time, further additions and changes will most likely have been made.
The Law of the Frostathing has survived in a number of manuscripts from the
fourteenth century. The earliest one has been dated to the time before 1350. Jan Rag-
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8 Brink 2002: 99; Brink 2003: 76; Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998.
9 Riisøy 2003: esp. 168.
10 F V 44-46, G 2 and 32; Helle 1972: 120-21; Helle 2001: 17-20; Knudsen 1960b; Helle
1974: 62-63.
11 In the 1160s, Olav Haraldsson already started to be seen as a saintly king, and also
began to be identified with ‘everything good in older Norwegian law’. It would therefore not
be surprising if other laws than his own were attributed to him. Chapters 10, 15, and 17 claim
to have been introduced by King Olav Haraldsson and Bishop Grímkell at the thing of Moster
(i.e. in the 1020s). It is important to point out that several other chapters than those attributed
to Olav Haraldsson and Bishop Grímkell are marked ‘Olav’. Helle 2001: 17-20; Helle 1997:
240; Knudsen 1960b; Maurer 1872: 56 and 63-64. Scholars have dated many of the chapters
in these laws on the basis of e.g. comparative and linguistic evidence. For further details, see
Sanmark 2004, chapters 4-7.
nar Hagland and Jørn Sandnes argued that the extant version of the Frostathing Law
dates from the 1260s. The dating of the regulations in this law causes some particu-
lar problems. The existing version makes it clear that it is based on an older version,
presumably a law named Grágás, which is mentioned in King Sverrir’s Saga. Ac-
cording to this saga, which dates from the early thirteenth century, King Magnus
Olavsson (1035-47) ordered that Grágás should be written down. We are also told
that King Sverrir (1177-1202) referred to this law in his struggle against Archbishop
Eirik around 1190. Eirik, on the other hand, is reported to have followed another
book, named Gullfjöðr, which had been put together by Archbishop Øystein (1161-
88). The date of Grágás has been much debated. Hagland and Sandnes have how-
ever argued that it must have existed, at the latest, in the twelfth century.12
The Law of King Magnus Lagabøter was accepted as law in the middle of the
1270s. It was issued in four editions, one for each of the law things.13 The oldest
surviving manuscript dates from the end of the thirteenth century. There is also a
number of manuscripts from the first half of the fourteenth century.14
To sum up, it is clear that the three laws discussed above represent three differ-
ent stages of the development of law over time. The Law of the Gulathing repre-
sents the oldest phase, the Frostathing law the intermediate stage, while the latest
phase is represented by the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter. It is in this chronolog-
ical order that the laws will be dealt with in this article.
Previous research regarding the individual and the family
The reasons why many scholars have focused on the emergence of the individual
must now be considered. The roots to this lie in the works of scholars from the late
nineteenth century to the end of the 1970s. During this time it was argued that Norse
Iron Age society was based around a patrilinear ‘clan-based’ kinship system, which
was seen to penetrate all aspects of life and society. When adherents of this school
discussed early Christian society, the assumed ‘clan-based’ society was juxtaposed
to the single elements in the written sources, above all in the provincial laws. The at-
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12 Hagland and Sandnes 1994: ix-xi and xxxxiii-xli; Indrebø 1920: chapters 112 and 117;
Knudsen 1959b: 656-57 and 1960c.
13 The dates provided by the different manuscripts vary between 1274 and 1276. Bøe 1966:
233.
14 Bøe 1966; Helle 2001: 11.
tention paid to these elements, which indisputably are there, has led to a partial neg-
lect of the continued presence of communal elements in the laws.15
Today, most scholars argue that the kinship system in Norse Iron Age society
was not based around clans. One such scholar is David Gaunt, who carried out a
study of Nordic provincial laws, Icelandic sagas and comparative anthropological ev-
idence. Gaunt found no evidence of a clan-based kinship system in the Nordic writ-
ten sources, and demonstrated that this idea had instead been introduced by
nineteenth-century scholars. He concluded that Norse society was based around nu-
clear families rather than extended families or clans. Gaunt also argued that the kin-
ship system was not patrilinear, but bilateral, i.e. a person belonged to her/his
mother’s family to the same extent as her/his father’s family.16 Torben Anders Vester-
gaard, who carried out an anthropological kinship analysis based on early Norwegian
laws, has moreover argued for the existence of a minimal ætt fellowship, which for
each individual included five generations. He stated that ‘the relations between un-
related minimal ættir are generally defined as relations belonging to the same soci-
ety, where all subscribe to the same law and general codes of conduct but specifically
they are only negatively defined as absence of any particular relationship; they are
open relations of potential alliance or hostility. Relationships between minimal ættir
result from choice and actions’.17
If we accept these arguments, it means that regulations that have previously been
seen to relate to whole clans instead concerned nuclear families only. Some of the
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15 Evidence for this was first found in written sources. In the 1950s, archaeologists began
supporting the idea of a patrilinear clan-based society. This was due to the finds of very large
houses dating from the Early Iron Age in south-western Norway. The sizes of the houses were
seen to suggest that extended families had been living under the same roof, a manner which
was seen as the ‘traditional’ way of living. Hagen 1953: 156-59; Johnsen 1948: esp. 60-98 and
119-38; Gaunt 1983, 186-210; Stjernquist 1983; Granlund 1972; Hamre 1976.
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Age. Widgren 1995: 5-6; Widgren 1986: 19-21; Edgren and Herschend 1982; Carlsson 1979.
Lars Ivar Hansen has moreover argued that the strengthening of the patrilinear elements seen
in the oldest Norwegian provincial laws formed part of a move by the traditional aristocracy
to ‘keep the patrimony together’, as the old system was now under threat by growing power
of the church and the monarchy. Hansen 1994: 133-45 and 153.
17 Vestergaard 1988: esp. 179-80; cf. Hansen 1994: 129-33.
most well-known examples are the regulations concerning the blood feud and in-
heritance of odal land.18 These types of regulations will not be included in this arti-
cle. They are however worth mentioning, as they provide examples of communal
elements in the laws, even though these may have consisted of fewer people than pre-
viously believed.
The communal elements that will be discussed in this article are different in the
sense that they are not based on kinship. They are instead, to a great extent, decided
by status in society and even by pure coincidences, such as presence at a crime scene.
This fits in well with the results presented by other scholars, such as the human geog-
rapher Mats Widgren. Widgren has argued that large numbers of ‘agricultural units’
must have cooperated in order to organise their land-use, e.g. regarding fencing sys-
tems and circulation of pasture. His study covers the period from the Early Iron Age
to the Middle Ages and suggests that the nature and degree of this type of cooperation
changed over time. In the words of Widgren: ‘a number of different links was contin-
uously in the picture: to the family, to some kind of village community, to other com-
munities, and possibly also to a landowner.19 Widgren thus provided a picture of a
society in which changing communal identities, to some degree created by coincidence
rather than family bonds, were seen as a natural part of everyday life. A similar picture
has been put forward by Sverre Bagge regarding ‘political man’ in Norwegian pre-
state society. Bagge argued that political alliances during this time were seldom per-
manent. Pre-state political ‘parties’ consisted of two types of members, i.e. the core
group which was strongly connected to the leader through permanent bonds such as
kinship and marriage, and a larger group with looser ties to the leader. The chosen al-
liances of this group seem to have been determined by their own potential gains.20
Before we go any further, two important aspects must be discussed. Firstly, it
must be noted that the judicial system was to a large extent based on customary law.
The laws were called ‘our laws’ and were seen as matters that people knew of and
agreed on. Matters brought to the thing, which the law did not cover, could only be
settled by formal tests, such as oaths or ordeals.21 The outcome of these cases then
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formed part of the law. Secondly, it is important to point out that that disagreements
should ideally be resolved through dooms, i.e. ‘private’ tribunals. The things were
seen as the last solution, if all else failed. The use of the dooms meant that the mat-
ters that were brought to the things most often had already been settled in the eyes
of the law. For these, no further discussions were needed, and the issuing of the ver-
dict was seen as a pure formality.22
The concept of ‘public knowledge’
The most important communal elements in the laws will now be considered. The
concept of ‘public knowledge’, which has been seen as the foundation of early Scan-
dinavian law, must first be discussed. This meant that ‘facts and agreements’, as well
as the ‘legal position between individuals’ had to be well-known.23 The implication
of this was that all legal matters had to be made known to the public. In cases of
conflicts, injuries and killings, the guilty parties must announce their acts. The of-
fended party must also announce it as a charge against her/him.24 The same princi-
ple applied to agreements of various kinds. Since very few, if any, written contracts
were drawn up, agreements should be made in the presence of witnesses (the term
used for this was skírskota). In case of later disagreements, the witnesses could be
called in.25 The significance of this concept can be demonstrated by the example of
vita fé. If a person had witnesses on a loan (of e.g. chattels) to another person, the
goods was called vita fé, i.e. goods that people knew of, and to which that person was
thus entitled. To not respect such a right was punishable by law.26 The role of the pub-
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pect of the judicial system was further enhanced by the fact that the legal proceedings should
be carried out according to detailed regulations set out in the laws. If these were not strictly
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23 Larson 1929: 137-38; Helle 2001: 90-91; Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998: 313-14.
24 Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998: 314; Helle 2001: 81 and 90; Meyer 1958.
25 Larson 1929, 137; Helle 2001: 90-91; Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998: 313-14.
26 G 49; Helle 2001: 91; Bøe 1960.
lic in matters of disagreements can be furthermore demonstrated by another exam-
ple. According to the Law of the Gulathing, a woman who had been physically
abused three times ‘at the table or at an ale feast’, i.e. in the presence of other peo-
ple, had the right to divorce her husband and take the ‘husband’s gift’ with her.27
There were two alternative ways of making deals in the presence of witnesses.
One was to announce legal matters at popular gatherings. The thing was seen as the
most suitable place, but churches, fully manned ships and ale houses were also men-
tioned as alternatives.28 The other option was to call in a number of people for the
specific purpose of witnessing what was said and done. This was recommended for
e.g. business agreements and dissolution of marriages. In most cases, the laws do not
state how many witnesses were required. They do however indicate that large num-
bers of witnesses were used. 29 Helle argued that this was the traditional way of treat-
ing such matters, and added that it is likely that they most often were dealt with at
large gatherings. This was however a rather complex procedure, and with time, the
number of required witnesses was reduced to two.30 This is indicated by at least one
chapter in the Law of the Gulathing, where it is stated that ‘one witness is as good
as none, but two is as good as ten’.31 As was pointed out above, Stein-Wilkeshuis has
demonstrated that regulations from pre-Christian times were at times included in the
medieval provincial laws.32 The complex procedure with a large number of wit-
nesses may be one such case, and which later on in time was replaced by a regula-
tion of Christian origin. That the simpler method represents a later stage of law is
supported by the fact that similar statements appear in the Bible. In the Book of
Deuteronomy, it is said that ‘one witness shall not rise up against a man for any in-
iquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses or at
the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be established’.33 It thus seems most
likely that this concept was included in the laws after the official introduction of
Christianity, and as such formed part of the move towards a more individual judicial
system and society. This is further supported by the fact that also in the Law of King
Magnus Lagabøter only two witnesses were required for these matters.34
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28 At these places it was possible to claim inheritance and carry out various kinds of trans-
actions. See e.g. G 87, 107, 125, 127, 292; Helle 2001: 90.
29 See e.g. G 36, 40, 78-79; Helle 2001: 90.
30 Helle 2001: 90-91.
31 G 59, cf. 35 and 266.
32 Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998.
33 Deut 19:15. See also 17:6.
34 L I 4 1-2, cf. L VII 8.
The concept of public knowledge had some interesting consequences. It meant
that all kinds of agreements and actions became known and thus also in a sense
‘communal property’.35 Furthermore, crimes committed in secret, such as theft, came
to be seen as ‘detestable’.36 In fact, theft was one of the few crimes for which the
Nordic laws allowed the guilty party to be killed on the spot.37 Robbery, on the other
hand, was seen as a less serious crime, as it was committed openly and the target had
a chance of defending her/himself.38 The effects of the distinction between ‘secret’
and ‘public’ crimes are also seen in other parts of the law, e.g. cases of murder and
accidental death. A person who had killed a slave or an outlaw must announce this
otherwise she/he would be held a murderer.39 The same could happen to witnesses
of an accidental death, who neglected to report the event to the heirs. Further exam-
ples that clearly demonstrate this principle are the regulations that required a person
who was guilty of murder to report this deed to the first person she/he met.40
The lack of an executive body must have further added to the common knowledge
of acts and agreements that today would be seen as rather private matters.41 This can
be illustrated by the procedure for the collection of fines, which is found in at least
two chapters of the Law of the Gulathing. Here it is stated that neighbours were re-
quired to help the priest or the bishop’s ármaðr (bailiff) to collect fines from guilty
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35 Cf. Larson 1929: 137.
36 Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998: 318-19.
37 The others were serious crimes, such as killings, injuries and sexual offences against
close kinswomen. Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998: 315 and 318-19; G 143 and 160; F IV 30 stated
that all men should have access to the thing apart from those who had killed at the thing and
those who had been caught with stolen property.
38 Revenge was therefore not allowed and the punishment was rather mild, i.e. a fine of
three merkr. Stein-Wilkeshuis 1998: 321.
39 G 182; F IV 1. The laws themselves consistently refer to ‘he’, ‘man’ and ‘men’, apart
from those regulations that are specifically aimed at women. These expressions have however
been seen as referring to people in general irrespective of sex and age. Helle 2001: 145;
Hertzberg 1874.
40 E.g. G 156, 158, 160, 161, 177, 182; F IV 1 and 7. According to G 156, the guilty party
did not have to report her/his deed in the first house on his way, if near relatives of dead per-
son lived there. The same applied to the second house. At the third house, she/he was how-
ever obliged to announce the deed, whoever lived there. Chapter 161 stated that a person who
found a corpse was obliged to report this to the first person that she/he met, other wise she/he
could be accused of murder. The concept of public knowledge is also present in G155, where
it is stated that when two people were accused of the same murder, and only one of them ap-
peared at the thing meeting, the absent party should be seen as one guilty of the crime.
41 Cf. Larson 1929: 137 and Seip 1959. Bagge has pointed to the lack of a distinction be-
tween ‘private’ and ‘public’ spheres during the Middle Ages. Bagge 1989: 241-43.
parties. Those who refused to do so would be liable to pay a fine.42 Similarly, accord-
ing to chapter 81 of the Gulathing Law, which deals with pasture disagreements, the
complainant should get the help of the freemen to drive the cattle off the land.43 Some
such elements were still present in the Law of the Frostathing and the Law of King
Magnus Lagabøter. These laws stated that a person who had wounded someone else
at the thing should be held in capture by the ármaðr and the sýslumaðr, with the help
of the freemen if needed.44 The Law of King Magnus Lagabøter moreover stated that
in cases of murder, it was the duty of those present to try to capture the guilty party.45
The concept of public knowledge clearly emerges in some other aspects of the
laws. For crimes committed in front of a ‘crowd’, no thing meeting was required in
order to determine who the guilty party was. If someone killed another person under
these circumstances, she/he should be executed on the spot.46 It is not always clear
how many people constituted a ‘crowd’. However, according to some chapters of
the Law of the Gulathing, 27 witnesses at a crime scene were seen as sufficient.47
There were however cases when fewer people were needed in order to find the guilty
party. This applied e.g. to cases when a person was killed in a ‘gang fight’, which in-
volved at least five people.48 The same concept is present in chapter 157 of the Law
of the Gulathing.49
Communal guilt and punishment
Chapter 157 in the Law of the Gulathing, which deals with murders committed in ale
houses, is moreover interesting as the communal elements here include guilt and
punishment. If such murders were carried out during the day or in the light of fire,
everyone present was obliged to find the guilty party, otherwise they should all pay
full atonement both to the kinsmen and the king.50 This means that they would all,
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42 G 9 and 19.
43 G 81.
44 F IV 10; L IV 9.
45 L IV 17.
46 G 183; Cf. F IV 10. This also applied to fully manned ships. G 171. In G 183 it is added
that if the wounded man was still alive after a scab had formed on the wound, the guilty party
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47 This applied e.g. when a thing meeting was called at a murder scene. If such a case was
to be heard ‘properly’ at a thingstead, ¼ of the thingmen must be present. G 151.
48 G 154, cf. 168.
49 G 157.
50 G 157.
in a sense, be held guilty of the murder (even if they were neither fined nor out-
lawed). The prospective payment of atonement must have served as a rather good en-
couragement to find a guilty party. The concept of public knowledge is evident in the
assumption that large numbers of people would have been present, awake, and with
enough light to see. During the night, slightly different regulations applied.51
The Law of the Gulathing furthermore contains regulations regarding quarrels in
ale houses. It was stated that all who were accused of ‘provoking a quarrel’ should
defend themselves with a three-fold oath.52 If this oath failed, they would each be li-
able to pay fine of fifteen merkr. In case ¼ of the men refused to swear the oath and
left the house, everyone who remained should pay the penalty. If fewer than ¼ de-
parted, they were to be considered the guilty ones and should thus pay the fine. Those
still present should defend themselves by oaths.53
The Law of the Frostathing also comprises regulations dealing with killings in
ale houses. By this time, however, some important changes had been introduced.
This law stated that it was the duty of those who sat closest to the victim to state
whether she/he had been killed or not. If they refused to do so, they should either owe
a fine of three merkr, or swear a three-fold oath that they did not know who the killer
was. Those who knew and refused to testify would never be ‘competent to bear wit-
ness’, nor should they ‘enjoy testimony of any sort’. It was then the heir of the dead
who should accuse the person she/he thought was guilty. This person should defend
her/himself with a twelve-fold oath or through the ordeal.54 This constitutes a clear
development from the Law of the Gulathing, as it was no longer the responsibility
of everyone who had been present at the time of the murder to find the guilty party,
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51 G 157. If a killing took place during the night, the one who reported it as his act should
be held guilty. If one person was missing, that party should be held guilty. If all were still
there, and no one announced the murder as their deed, the heir should accuse ‘whomever’
she/he wanted to.
52 According to the Norwegian laws there were four different types of oaths: the two fold-
oath (tveggja mannar eiðr), the three-fold oath (lýrittareiðr), the six-fold oath (séttareiðr) and
the twelve-fold oath (tylftareiðr). These oaths required one, two, five or eleven compurgators
respectively. The role of a compurgator (váttr) was to strengthen the oath given by the ac-
cused rather than to share any knowledge of the events connected to the crime. The serious-
ness of the crime determined which type of oath should be used. Both parties in a case usually
participated in the selection of compurgators. If any of the compurgators refused to take the
oath or failed to take it correctly, the entire oath was invalid. Hamre 1958; Virtanen 1958:489;
Larson 1938: 424.
53 G 187
54 F IV 15. Similar regulations applied to killings at ‘ale feasts’. F IV 14.
nor to pay the atonement. It is however important to note that the implications for
those who refused to act as witnesses were harsh. To be unable to ‘enjoy testimony
of any sort’, meant in practice that a person could not receive any defence in future
legal cases.
The Law of the Gulathing contains several other regulations where everyone
present at a crime scene could be held equally guilty. One such example is the reg-
ulation regarding two people who met at a cross roads and one killed the other. If the
dying person was still able to speak when she/he was found, then the person whom
she/he accused should be held guilty (unless this person could prove his/her inno-
cence through the ordeal). However, if another person reported the killing as her/his
deed, they should both be held guilty, even if the corpse had only one wound.55 In
this chapter, no evident wish to find out who had committed the crime is seen. An-
other regulation, in which the same sentiment is present, is the regulation regarding
three people who travelled together and one person killed another. If the two sur-
vivors accused each other, they should both be held as banesmen.56
The Law of the Frostathing is slightly different, as this law displays at least a
vague desire to find one guilty party. This law stated that if three people were to-
gether and one person was killed, and both survivors accused each other, both should
by tried by ordeal.57 The same aspiration is also seen in a regulation concerning sim-
ilar circumstances in the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter.58
Two further examples of communal guilt in the Law of the Gulathing will now
be considered. The first concerns accidents; if someone was killed on the beams un-
derneath a ship, everyone who had been present should pay the dead person’s
wergeld. Moreover, if one boat happened to ram another boat that had its dragnets
out, and someone was thus killed, everyone on the offending boat should pay the
wergeld.59 The second example concerns killings caused by ‘gang fighting’. Ac-
cording to the Law of the Gulathing, those men who provoked the murder should pay




56 G 155. According to G 208, if two men had a fight and there were no witnesses, they
should both pay atonement to the king.
57 F IV 6. G 156 did however state that if no other person confessed to the murder, the one
whom the dying person had accused should be tried by ordeal.
58 This law stated that in cases when a wounded person could with certainty point out the
guilty party, this person should defend her/himself with a twelve-fold oath. L IV 11.
59 G 173 and 174.
sides should pay the wergeld and a fine of 40 merkr to the king.60 According to the
Law of the Frostathing, if no one assumed the guilt on such occasions, all who had
been involved should be outlawed. The heir had moreover the right to accuse the
‘best person’ as the killer.61 In the latter example, a clear development towards more
individual law can thus be seen.
Moreover, according to the laws of the Gula and the Frostathing, also the execu-
tion of punishments could be communal. This concerned thieves who had stolen
goods worth less than one ørtog. In these cases, the guilty party should ‘run the gaunt-
let’, i.e. the people should form a ‘street’ through which the thief should run, while
they were hurling stones and turf at her/him.62 The laws do not state whether these
thieves should be killed or not. It can however be assumed that this decision was left
to the participants.63 The serious consequences of petty theft clearly demonstrate the
fundamentality of the concept of public knowledge to the population in early me-
dieval Norway. It is furthermore interesting to note that by the time of the Law of
King Magnus Lagabøter the punishment of running the gauntlet was no longer al-
lowed. By this time, the population could no longer participate in the execution of
punishments. Moreover, in this law, the punishments for theft were reduced, so that
a person could steal for the sum of one eyrir three times without losing her/his life.64
In this way, the laws became more compassionate, which may be seen as part of a gen-
eral move towards more a ‘humane’ legislation.65 It could however also be suggested
that an equally strong reason for this development was the gradually decreasing im-
portance of the concept of public knowledge, evidenced in the Law of King Magnus
Lagabøter. This law recommended that for important deals, written documents should
be drawn up, so that in case the lawman had to give a verdict on the matter, there was
‘evidence of their purchase, even if the witnesses were not present’.66 It can thus be
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60 G 167.
61 F IV 23.
62 G 253; F XIV 12; Helle 2001, 102; Bøe 1964. According to chapter 168 of Bjarkøyret-
ten, a person who was about to run the gauntlet should have her/his head shaved and then
covered with tar and feathers. A person who did not throw anything at the thief during the ‘run’
should pay a fine. Bøe 1964.
63 As was stated above, theft was punishable by death.
64 L IX 1; Bøe 1964: 452. Another communal aspect concerned ‘finds’. If two people were
travelling together, and the one who walked in front of the other found something of value,
they should both have an equal share of it. The same applied to people travelling by boat. G
144; Carlsson 1964.
65 Bøe 1966: 235.
66 This has been seen as influence from Roman law. L VIII 11; Robberstad 1969: 134.
argued that, in the long-term, the more widespread use of written documents as evi-
dence, as opposed to ‘public knowledge’, led to more privacy regarding legal matters.
Women and slaves formed part of the freemen’s collective
Finally, it must be mentioned that slaves in particular, and to some extent also
women, formed part of the freemen’s collective. The situation of women will first be
discussed. According to the laws, women who were minors or married had the least
power to act on their own in legal matters. Their guardians or husbands should re-
ceive atonement on their behalf, and presumably also represented them at the thing.
Women themselves were allowed to act as plaintiffs or defendants in certain cases,
although in settlements concerning odal land, they had to be represented by a man.67
Helle has argued that women were only in exceptional circumstances accepted as
witnesses.68 It is however possible that women were in practice rather more active
than what is implied by the laws. Nils Ahnlund has shown that in 15th-century Jämt-
land and Härjedalen (Sweden), from which districts a lot of written documentation
has been preserved, women were rather active in legal matters. In these areas, women
often carried out economic transactions on their own and they also acted as witnesses
for legal transactions concerning land. Purchases were moreover made by husband
and wife together and when land was sold, the wife’s consent was often required.
Ahnlund suggested that these women may have been more independent than those
in other geographical areas, which could be due to ‘the population’s lively com-
mercial frame of mind’. 69 The possibility must however be considered that women
in earlier time periods and other areas were as active, and that it maybe the lack of
source material which prevents us from seeing this.
In terms of punishment, women were however seen as individuals, even in the
eyes of the law. A woman, who committed murder, should be outlawed, just as a
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67 G 47, 197 and 290-91; F X 36, XI 7; Helle 2001: 141-45; Robberstad 1969: 132. One
exception regarding atonements concerned fights between women. In these cases, the atone-
ment could only be claimed by the women. G 190.
68 Helle based this argument on the Law of the Gulathing where it is stated that women
were allowed to act as witnesses in cases of murder of close relatives, such as their husband,
brother, son or father. Helle 2001: 145.
69 Ahnlund 1948: 497.
man. Moreover, if a woman injured someone else, she should pay the compensation
and a fine to the king.70
In the earliest phase of law, slaves clearly constituted another communal ele-
ment in the society of the freemen. The slaves’ position within the judicial system
was more restricted than that of the women, as the slaves were seen as the property
of their masters.71 The masters received fines on behalf of their slaves, but also had
some legal responsibility over them. This means that if a slave was killed, the mas-
ter would receive the atonement. On the other hand, if a slave worked on a feast day,
it was the master who should pay the fine. However, if the slaves committed a seri-
ous crime, they would receive the punishment, which often was flogging.72 In these
cases the slaves, in the same way as free women, were seen as individuals, respon-
sible for their own actions, presumably as this was the easiest option for the
freemen.73 It is worth pointing out that in cases of murder, the master could take an
oath on behalf of his slave. This was however rather risky since the master would be
outlawed if the oath failed,74 may thus not have been commonly occurring.
Private dooms
The communal character of the private dooms will now be considered. The laws
stated that cases regarding private ownership (such as odal land), which could nei-
ther be backed up by witnesses nor public knowledge, could be taken before a doom
(dómr). As mentioned above, this was a private tribunal, which should bring the par-
ties to a ‘friendly agreement’, without involving the thing assembly.75 If someone had
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70 G 159 and 190; F IV 33 and 35. One difference was that outlawed women should be es-
corted out of the country by relatives, while men were given five days during which they had
to leave the country. Helle 2001: 144.
71 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Iversen 1994: 67-77. See also Helle 2001:
125-28.
72 G 16-18, 22, 163 and 259; F II 2, X 40 and X 44; Helle 2001: 126.
73 It is also worth noting that in cases of ‘housebreaking’ slaves were allowed act as wit-
nesses. F IV 5. Tore Iversen has argued that slaves were distinguished from cattle in the way
that slaves were seen to be capable of acting on their own. A slave was thus regarded as a per-
son ‘in the negative sense’, i.e. some one who could be punished for her/his actions, as op-
posed to a person ‘in the positive sense’ who additionally also had rights in the eyes of the law.
Iversen 1994:88-9.
74 G 163, cf. Iversen 1994: 87.
75 Halvorsen 1958: 215; Helle 2001: 91; Larson 1929: 138-39; Robberstad 1969: 133-34.
For a detailed description of the dooms, see Larson 1929.
an economic demand on another person, she/he should summon that person to be at
home on a particular day and then on that day, in the presence of witnesses, order
her/him to pay the debt. The defendant could then either pay up, agree to a doom, or
refuse to pay. In the last case, she/he would be called to the thing. If she/he opted for
a doom, each of the two parties should choose up to six people each, who were to
be members of the doom. In order to avoid bias and undue pressure, neither close rel-
atives (by blood or marriage) nor the king’s officials (the ármaðr or the lendr maðr)
could be included.76 It is important to point out that the aim of the doom was not to
evaluate the actual circumstances of the case, but rather to test whether the plaintiff
had legal witnesses for her/his demands. If that was the case, the defendant could
only avoid paying the demanded sum by denying the claim through an oath.77
In cases regarding odal land, up to three dooms could be held. At the first one,
the plaintiff should bring three witnesses for the odal and also witnesses to verify the
testimony of the odal witnesses. The defendant could only win the case by naming
at least one more of both types of witnesses than the plaintiff. The counter witnesses
should be brought to a second doom. If the defendant did not manage to bring more
witnesses than the plaintiff to this doom, she/he had lost the case. If she/he suc-
ceeded, the plaintiff should give her/him the right to the land.78 If the numbers of wit-
nesses were equal, the case should be taken to a third doom, which consisted of
twelve people (six from each side). All the members of this doom should place a bet
of two aurar each, to prove that their side was right. If someone refused to do this,
that side lost the case. However, if they all agreed to place the bet, the matter should
be taken to the thing.79 Helle has pointed out that in reality, presumably only the
first doom took place. This is supported by some other chapters of the Law of the Gu-
lathing, where it is stated that both new witnesses and counter witnesses could be
brought to the first doom.80 Despite this, it was a very laborious process, which in-
volved the cooperation and agreement of large numbers of people.
Over time, there was a gradual move towards a simpler judicial system, where
matters were decided by fewer people. The role of the doom was drastically reduced
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76 The role of the king’s officials will be discussed in more detail below.
77 See e.g. G 37 and 47; F X 36; Halvorsen 1958; Helle 2001: 91. The procedures for oath-
taking will be discussed below.
78 G 60 and 266; Helle 2001: 91-92.
79 G 266; Helle 2001: 91-92.
80 G 86 and 121; Helle 2001: 93; Cf. F XII 6-8 and X 12-15. It is moreover interesting to
note that Imsen argued that the doom presumably originated from the legal system of the ‘pre-
state society’. Imsen 1990: 29.
in the Law of the Frostathing, and by the time of the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter
the private doom had been more or less removed from the law. The dooms did how-
ever continue to be used within the public sphere of the judicial system, but in a
much less complex form. The Law of King Magnus Lagabøter stated that important
cases at the thing should be tried by a doom consisting of twelve people. For less se-
rious offences, the dooms were reduced to six people.81
The communal aspects of the legal proceedings
The communal nature of the legal proceedings at the things will now be considered.
The thing organisation consisted of things at different levels of society; local, re-
gional and supra-regional. The local and regional things were althings, which meant
that all the ‘thingmen’ were required to attend, i.e. the freemen who had at least one
worker aged over fifteen. Widows, lone workers and those ‘not able bodied’ could
attend the meetings if they wished.82 According to the laws, the four law things
(lögþing), i.e. the Gulathing, the Frostathing, the Eidsivathing and the Borgarthing
were the highest instances.83 Jens Arup Seip has however shown, on the basis of
documents dating from the 14th century onwards, that the Eidsivathing and the Bor-
garthing very rarely functioned as law things for the whole of their legal districts. On
a more regular basis, these two things seem to have served as local and regional legal
assemblies.84 The laws moreover state that for each of the law things, there was a set
number of chosen representatives whose presence at the meetings was obligatory.
The regulations regarding who could become a representative were the same as those
for the thingmen in the Law of the Gulathing.85
At the local and regional things, the verdicts were settled by the thingmen. Since
no executive power existed, it may have been difficult to get the population to respect
these verdicts. It must thus have been important to get the agreement of as many men
as possible. If the men at the lowest thing instance (fjórðungsþing) could not reach a
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81 L IV 4-5; Halvorsen 1958: 215-16; Helle 2001: 93; Andersen 1977: 258.
82 G 131; F I. According to G 131 lone-workers were required to attend the king’s things,
muster things and things that dealt with murders. A man who had someone working for him
who was under the age of fifteen was considered a lone-worker. For an overview and discus-
sion of the different levels of things, see Helle 2001: 76-81.
83 G 35 and 266; Helle 2001: 76; Hagland and Sandnes 1994: xv-xvii; Knudsen 1959a: 654
and 1960a: 556; Bøe 1965a: 178.
84 Seip 1934: 25-27.
85 They should be bǿndr who had at least one person over the age of fifteen working for
them. L I 1; cf. G 131.
unanimous verdict, the case could be taken to the next level, which was the thing of
the fylki. At these meetings, a verdict was valid, as long as ¾ of the thingmen could
reach an agreement. Otherwise, the case could be brought to the law thing.86 Thus, at
these levels, the verdicts were communal decisions taken by large numbers of people.
The way in which matters were settled at the law things, and by whom, is not en-
tirely clear. According to the Olav-text in the Law of the Gulathing, there should be
c. 400 representatives at the Gulathing.87 In the text attributed to Magnus, the num-
ber of representatives had been reduced to 246.88 The Law of the Frostathing stated
that 400 representatives were required to attend the meetings of the Frostathing.89
The Law of King Magnus Lagabøter introduced some changes into this area of the
judicial system. For the Gulathing, the number of representatives was further re-
duced to 148. The drastic character of this reform is made clear when one considers
that, at the same time, four fylki were added to the judicial district of the Gulathing.
For the Frostathing, on the other hand, the number of representatives was kept the
same as before, i.e. 400.90
The duties and functions of the representatives are not always clearly described
in the sources. According to the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter, only 36 (3x12) of
the representatives should serve as law court men (lögréttumenn).91 These men
should sit inside an enclosure (vébönd) at the thing site and it was their duty was to
make a decision regarding the cases brought to the things.92 The rest of the people
who were present should be gathered outside the vébönd and approve the law court




86 G 35, 266; Helle 2001: 97; Taranger 1924: 20.
87 The number of representatives varied between the fylki and was probably in some way
connected to the number of inhabitants. The following numbers of representatives were re-
quired from the different fylki: Hordafylki 102, Rogafylki 102, Firdafylki 80, Sognfylki 64,
Egdafylki 27 and from South Møre (Sunnmøre) as many who wished to attend. This makes a
total of 375 plus the men from South Møre. G 3; Helle 2001: 65-66; Taranger 1924: 17-18.
88 Fewer representatives were now required from each district. G 3; Helle 2001: 65-66;
Taranger 1924: 17-18.
89 It was stated that 40 representatives from each of the four fylki of Inner Trondheim and
sixty from the four fylki of Outer Trondheim should be present, i.e. in total 400 men. F I 2;
Taranger 1924: 28-29.
90 L I 2; Taranger 1924: 38-40.
91 L I 3; Robberstad 1971: 142; Andersen 1974: 353.
92 L I 5. The vébönd is described in Egil’s Saga, Jones 1960: chapter 56, 139; cf. Brink
2002: 90; Helle 2001: 71-72.
93 G 267, 279 and 292; F XII 2, XII 4 and XIV 4; L I 5; Helle 2001: 72-74.
The laws of the Gula and the Frostathing do not make it clear whether all the rep-
resentatives should serve as law court men, or whether they should participate out-
side the vébönd. This uncertainty has caused debate among scholars. Some have
argued that it would have been impossible for 400 men to agree on legal matters.
These scholars have thus suggested that the 400 representatives mentioned in the
Law of the Frostathing must have represented the total number of representatives
that were required to attend the thing meetings.94 It was thus argued that the law
court at the Frostathing consisted of 36 men, as was the case in the Law of King
Magnus Lagabøter. Support for this argument was found in the regulations in the
Law of the Gulathing that required all these men to take an oath at the opening of the
law thing. It was suggested that this meant that all the representatives, when needed,
were entitled to take part in the proceedings of the law court, something which the
thingmen were not.95
Other scholars have argued that it is not unreasonable to believe that all of the
400 representatives were law court men. One such scholar is Helle, who supported
his view by a number of arguments. Firstly, he drew attention to the fact that the
Law of the Frostathing clearly stated that all 400 representatives should sit inside the
vébönd. Secondly, that also at the Gulathing, all of the 400 representatives seem to
have served as law court men. This is indicated by the fact that the Law of the Gu-
lathing on one occasion named the law court (lögrétta) as the highest instance and
on another occasion the Gulathing. Helle moreover argued that the oath that the Gu-
lathinglaw required the law court men to take probably had the same effect as the
‘judgement oath’ that the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter required from the law
court men. Finally, Helle compared the vébönd to the ‘court circle’ hinted at by some
Swedish provincial laws. According to these laws, all the freemen present at the
thing meetings should sit inside some kind of circle (a þing oc a ring).96
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94 The regulation in the Law of the Frostathing that stated that the 400 representatives
should sit inside the vébönd has been explained as copying error made by a scribe. F I 2; Helle
2001: 71-72; Hagland and Sandnes 1994: xxvii- xxviii; Robberstad 1971: 142; Knudsen
1959a: 655.
95 Absalon Taranger was of the same view as Knut Helle, both regarding the Gulathing and
the Frostathing. He stated that ‘there is no indication of the twelve-man system’ in the Law
of the Gulathing, and that there was ‘no doubt’ that the law thing at the Frostathing consisted
400 men. Taranger 1924: 21 and 29-31. Helle 2001: 71-72; Hertzberg 1874: 120-24; Hagland
and Sandnes 1994: xxvii-iii; Robberstad 1971: 142.
96 G 3, 35 and 266; L I 2-3; Helle 2001: 72; Holmbäck and Wessén 1979: Dalalagen, Tju-
vnadsbalken V and Västmannalagen Mannhelgdsbalken XXVI §5; Modéer 1974: 334-35. G
240 moreover contains a reference to a ‘thing ring’ (þíngríng).
Taking all the above evidence into consideration, it therefore seems most likely
that all the representatives in the laws of the Gula and the Frostathing were law court
men, and thus took part in the decision making process. In order to be able to accept
Helle’s argument, it is important to once again stress the formality of verdicts in the
early Middle Ages. The presence of many people at the law things may thus not nec-
essarily have constituted a hindrance to the proceedings. It must be pointed out that,
even if one disagrees with this conclusion, and takes the view that the law courts of
the Gulathing and the Frostathing consisted of 36 men only, it still means that the
thing proceedings were communal efforts. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that
the decisions taken by the men inside the vébönd should be approved by vápnatak
by the rest of the thingmen. This communal procedure applied to the things at all lev-
els. Whether this was a pure a formality, or not, will be discussed below.
The influence of the king and his officials on the thing proceed-
ings
The question is whether the legal decisions and verdicts were communal also in prac-
tice. This is of course a difficult question to answer, since there are no protocols from
the court proceedings. During the early Middle Ages three different types of royal
officials existed: the ármaðr, the lendr maðr and the sýslumaðr. These were the
king’s representatives regarding legal, economic and military matters.97 Their duties
and influence in connection to the decision making process of the things will now
be considered. It was their duty to call the thing meetings, attend the thing meetings
as the king’s representatives,98 and name the representatives for the law things.99
These men should moreover construct the vébönd, as well as oversee executions and
corporal punishments.100 The main difference between them was their social status.
The ármaðr was purely a royal servant, and thus of rather low status. During the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the royal ármaðr gradually disappeared, and his du-
ties were transferred to the sýslumaðr, who seems to have been of rather high social
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97 The duties of these officials have been examined by many scholars. Helle 2001: 149-
56; Andersen 1972 and 1976b; Bøe 1965b.
98 According to the Olav-text in the Law of the Gulathing, the lendr maðr and the ármaðr
had thing duty. In the Magnus-text, it is stated that some of the lendr maðr should stay at
home to look after the property of those who were away. G 3; Helle 2001: 71 and 155.
99 According to the Magnus-text in the Law of the Gulathing and the Law of King Mag-
nus Lagabøter, it was the lendr maðr, ármaðr, or sýslumaðr who should name the represen-
tatives. G 3; L I 1; Helle 2001: 67.
100 Andersen 1972: 651-52 and 1976b.
standing. Documents from the second half of the thirteenth century moreover sug-
gest that the sýslumaðr was the king’s local representative in the administrative dis-
tricts called the sýsla. He was in this way the prime mover within a stronger and
more efficient local rule.101 The lendr maðr and the ármaðr were contemporaries.
The lendr maðr was a local magnate with his own powerbase, who had presumably
received land from the king in exchange for his service. Since these two officials
had more or less the same duties, it seems that the lendr maðr should act as a stand-
in, if no ármaðr was available.102 The abolishment of the ármaðr and the transfer of
power to the sýslumaðr clearly show the strengthening of royal power, and as a con-
sequence, the reduction of the influence of the bǿndr103 on the judicial proceedings.
The laws thus clearly show that these officials had important roles in the judicial
system. There is nothing to suggest, however, that these men should take part in the
actual thing proceedings, rather the opposite. The Law of the Frostathing clearly
stated that the lendr maðr, must not ‘appear in the law court’, unless he had received
permission from the bǿndr. In another chapter it is stated that a lendr maðr should
not ‘be present at a five-day moot…unless he has a suit to prosecute or to defend’.104
The ármaðr does not seem to have played any role in the actual thing proceedings,
apart from constructing the vébönd.
Further evidence that the royal officials should not be involved in legal pro-
ceedings is the prohibitions for them to take part in the private doom. Indeed, any-
one who appointed a lendr maðr or an ármaðr to a doom would lose by default.105
These officials were not even allowed to be near the proceedings. This is particularly
clearly seen in the Law of the Frostathing, where it is stated that the lendr maðr
should not “come to a doom or to a farm where a doom is sitting, except he be trav-
elling on the highway; but if he does come, let them both go forth, plaintiff and de-
fendant, and order him to leave”.106
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101 The bishop’s bailiff existed until the end of the 13th century. Helle 2001: 150-52; An-
dersen 1972 and 1976b: 450.
102 G 3 and 152; Helle 2001: 149-52; Bøe 1965b; Andersen 1976: 448-49.
103 A bóndi is here defined as a freeman who was the head of his household and could
thus represent all the members of this house at thing meetings at various levels. Bjørkvik
1957.
104 F 1 2 and X 16; Helle 2001: 154-55. The Frostathinglaw added that ‘no man who is not
appointed to the law court shall have a seat within the enclosure’. F I 2.
105 G 37; Helle 2001: 154-55. According to G 37, the lendr maðr and the ármaðr should
‘not be allowed to approach so near the doom that their voices can be heard’.
106 F X 16.
The power and duties of the royal officials must now be set in relation to those
of the representatives and the thingmen. The laws do on several occasions refer to
the representatives and the thingmen as bǿndr.107 As mentioned above, the Law of
King Magnus Lagabøter stated that the representatives should be freemen who had
people working for them. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that those who
were chosen as representatives are likely to have been rather powerful men within
the bóndi community.108 They are however unlikely to have been magnates, as they
do not seem to have been economically strong. According to the Olav-text in the
Law of the Gulathing, the representatives should be provided with food and money
for their travels to and from the law things. These measures were increased in King
Magnus’s revision when the number of representatives was cut. The increase in pro-
visions suggests that it had been difficult to make sure that all the representatives at-
tended the thing meetings.109 Economic difficulties may partly have been of the
reason for this.
Moreover, the laws of the Gula and the Frostathing clearly distinguish between
the lendr maðr and the ármaðr on the one hand, and the bǿndr on the other. The of-
ficials’ legal position was for example above that of the bǿndr. Helle has moreover
argued that the royal officials could not have been part of the bǿndr, since it was
from this group that they should choose the representatives.110
Another interesting aspect is that the bǿndr could take the royal officials to the
thing in case they exceeded their duties. If an ármaðr was found guilty, his fine should
be paid to the bǿndr. The Laws of Gula and the Frostathing moreover prescribed a
rather light punishment for those who had wounded or killed an ármaðr.111 The in-
tention may have been to create a balance between the king and the bóndi commu-
nity. The bǿndr should be able to afford to stop an ármaðr who had acted beyond his
powers. Also a lendr maðr could be taken to the thing. His fines should however be
Collegium Medievale 2006
52 Alexandra Sanmark
107 Helle 2001: 68. In G 3 it is stated that the bǿndr had the duty to meet up at the alth-
ings. In chapter 131 of the same law, the representatives from Sunnmøre are referred to as
bǿndr. Moreover, according to F I 2 the lendr maðr would only have access to the law court
if the bǿndr allowed it.
108 L I 1; Helle 2001: 68-69. Since lone-workers were not required to attend the meetings
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Helle 2001: 68.
109 G 3; Helle 2001: 68-69.
110 G 141, 152, 200, 253, 267 and 314; F 1 2; Helle 2001: 68.
111 The punishment for wounding or killing an ármaðr was a fine of fifteen merkr. G 71,
141 and 170; F IV 57 and X 33. Helle 2001: 150-51; Bøe 1965b: 502.
split between the king and the bǿndr, which demonstrates his position between the
two.112 Moreover, if a lendr maðr killed someone in their own house, he himself
should be killed. If he fled the kingdom, he would be permanently outlawed.113
This should be compared to the regulation in the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter
which stated that a person who killed a lawman on account of his ‘correct’ declara-
tion of the law was to be permanently outlawed.114 This regulation clearly shows
the increasing royal power. By this time, it must have been extremely difficult for the
bǿndr to have any influence on the judicial proceedings.
The communal idea can also be clearly seen (in theory) in the regulations re-
garding the introduction of new law. Chapter 2 of the Law of the Gulathing which
dealt with royal succession was centrally issued by King Magnus Erlingsson, the
church, and approved by a national assembly, presumably the meeting of 1163/64.
The heading of this chapter in the Codex Rantzovianus reads:
These are new ordinances which were published by K[ing] M[agnus] on the ad-
vice of Archbishop Eystein, Erling Jarl, and all the most prudent men in Norway
[my underlining].115
In the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter, from the 1270s, the wording of the head-
ing to chapter IV 13 reads more or less the same, word for word.116 It is significant
that the laws were ‘published’ by the king after the ‘advice’ of his men. The actual
acceptance of the law did not occur until it was ‘taken’ (tekin), which presumably
happened at the Gulathing. This must however have been theory rather than practice.
It is clear that kings could of old introduce new law. Thus, when Magnus Erlingsson
formulated his laws, the representatives had little choice but to accept them. It is
however interesting to note that the Codex Rantzovianus, from the 1250s, still placed
the formal acceptance of law with the law thing.117 A clear change can be seen in an
edition of the ecclesiastical regulations from the early fourteenth century. In this edi-
tion, the heading to the regulation regarding royal succession stated that it was the
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113 F IV 52. It is interesting to note that the same regulations applied to kings and ‘jarls’.
F IV 50-51. Moreover, according to F IV 53, a freeman who wounded someone should pay a
fine of two baugar, while a lendr maðr should pay twelve baugar. An offending jarl should
pay 24 baugar and a king 48 baugar. A baug was here constituted by twelve øre.
114 L IV 3.
115 G 2.
116 L IV 13. ‘These…were given by King Magnus… with the advice and agreement of
the most prudent men in the country, and after the plea of the public’.
117 Helle 2001: 147-48.
king, archbishop, jarl and national assembly who accepted this chapter. By this time,
the king seems to have emerged from being the lawgiver in reality, to also having
been accepted as the formal lawgiver.118
Considering all the evidence, it seems clear that the bǿndr had a rather strong po-
sition in the earliest laws. Naturally, it must have been difficult for the bǿndr to take
the lead in practice also in the time of the Older Law of the Gulathing. But, as Helle
has pointed out, it is significant that the bǿndr according to the laws did not want to
give the real judicial power to the king.119 In connection to this, the formality of the
thing proceedings must once again be stressed. It therefore seems most plausible
that the representatives at the Gulathing and Frostathing originally were the ones
who settled legal matters.120
The growing power of the lawman
The system of involving large numbers of men in the legal proceedings seems to
have changed with the increasing powers of the lawman (lögmaðr). In the earliest
Middle Ages, the lawman should recite the law to the public and also give órskurðr,
i.e. explain the stance of the law regarding matters brought to the thing. At this time,
the lawman appears to have represented the bǿndr, rather than any higher author-
ity.121 However, from the time of King Sverrir, the lawman became a royal official.
His órskurðr increased in importance and gradually gained the character of a verdict.
By the 1260s, the lawman had become an approved judge.122 This can be demon-
strated by the following quote from the Law of the Frostathing:
we have frequently heard [it said] that some men, though justly accused, re-
fuse to appear before the lawmen, even when summoned as the law directs;
and many refuse to accept the lawman’s opinion after he has declared the law.
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118 Helle 2001: 147-48.
119 Helle 2001: 155. Sverre Bagge has shown that powerful people received preferential
treatment in legal matters in the early Middle Ages. Bagge 2001a.
120 Cf. Helle 2001: 72.
121 Tobiassen 1965: 154-55; Helle 2001: 74-75; Robberstad 1971: 143.
122 Tobiassen 1965: 154-56; Helle 2001: 74; Robberstad 1971: 142-43. However, also in
the Law of the Frostathing, it is stated that the ‘men who are appointed to the law court shall
declare the law...And in all cases that are not clearly determined by the law book, that is to be
followed which the men of the law court are unanimously agreed upon and which seems most
equitable before God’. F I 2.
But it was our intention to employ lawmen and to endow them with grants
out of our revenue and inheritance [to the end] that every man should be able
to bring his suits to a conclusion according to the legislation of the holy King
Olaf and the opinion of these lawmen.123
This regulation clearly demonstrates that the power of decision making in the judi-
cial system had been passed into the hands of individuals. This was naturally part of
the king taking over this system, but was presumably also connected to the Christian
idea of judges as individuals. The power of the lawman is also clearly seen in the Law
of King Magnus Lagabøter where it is stated that when the law court men could not
agree, the lawman should decide together with those law court men who agreed with
him. It is moreover likely that it was the lawman who appointed the law court men.124
The sáttmál and the órskurðr
Another development towards individual decision making is the appearance of the
sáttmál. This meant that matters for which the position of the law was well-known,
could be settled by kings’ or bishops’ officials, without the need for a thing meeting.
These officials had thus in practice gained the function of judges. In the Law of the
Gulathing, the sáttmál is only found on one occasion. As this chapter cannot be dated,
the only thing that can be said with certainty is that the sáttmál was known at least
from the end of the period when the Law of the Gulathing was valid. Since it appears
only once, it does not yet seem to have become common procedure. It has been sug-
gested that the king supported this practice from the end of the thirteenth century.125
A further, and most significant, move towards placing the power over the legal
decision making in the hands of individuals is found in the Law of King Magnus
Lagabøter. The king had now acquired the right to overturn all verdicts. According
to the law, the king could break the lawman’s órskurðr if he had another opinion of
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merkr. F Introduction 16.
124 L I 4; Helle 2001: 74-75; Tobiassen 1965: 154-56; Bøe 1965a: 180.
125 G 33; Helle 2001: 157-58. This should be compared to Iceland in 1262-4 when the Ice-
landers accepted the rule of the Norwegian king Hákon gamli Hákonarson and his son Mag-
nús. This took place at a meeting of the althing where the rights and duties of both parties were
set out. At this time, the Icelanders agreed to pay tax to the Norwegian king as long as he ful-
filled a number of specific conditions, such as allowing the population live in peace and use
their own laws. If the king did not fulfil these conditions, the Icelanders would be freed from
the agreement. This settlement later came to be called Gizurarsáttmáli and has been consid-
ered as one of the most important documents of Icelandic history. Guðni Jónsson 1960.
the position of the law, or if he ‘with the agreement of wise men should see that
something else is truer’. This right was justified by the simple statement: ‘because
he [the king] is above the law’.126
The increased significance of outlawry as a punishment
The concept of outlawry must also be discussed. According to the Germanic school
of thought, outlawry was the traditional punishment in Old Norse society. More re-
cent research has however painted a rather different picture. It is now argued that out-
lawry may go far back in time, but if this is the case, it was used as punishment for
only a small number of very serious crimes. Outlawry is instead seen as a punishment
that medieval kings and clerics used increasingly over time. This has been demon-
strated for Swedish and Danish laws and can be seen also in the Norwegian mate-
rial. It is clearly shown by chapter 32 of the Law of the Gulathing, which was issued
after the 1163/64 revision, where the number of crimes for which the punishment
would be permanent outlawry was greatly increased.127 The use of outlawry as pun-
ishment was further increased during the thirteenth century, e.g. in the Law of King
Magnus Lagabøter.128 The extended use of this punishment is an additional part of
the development towards a society more focused on the individual, since outlaws
were, temporarily or permanently, excluded from society. Anyone could thus kill
her/him without being punished. It was moreover prohibited to travel with outlaws
or indeed to help them in any way.129 This can be seen as a clear breech with the tra-
ditional family-based society, in which the blood feud had played a large part. This
involved the taking of revenge on behalf of relatives, e.g. if someone was killed, a
member of the offender’s family also had to be killed. The move towards a more in-
dividual society is furthermore demonstrated by the increasing prohibitions against
the blood feud over time. By the time of the Law of King Magnus Lagabøter, this
practice had been almost fully outlawed.130
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127 G 32; Helle 2001: 99-101.
128 Bøe 1959: 602; see e.g. L IV 4.
129 G 140, 202-3 and 207; F IV 41; L IV 8.
130 Wallén 1962: 239-40; Johnsen 1948: 73-92.
The taking of oaths
Finally, the oath taking procedure will be taken into consideration. Also here, some
strong communal elements were present. As mentioned above, oaths were used for
matters which had not previously been settled. In most cases, the oath taker needed
a number of compurgators to confirm her/his oath.131 The compurgators can be seen
as character witnesses, since their oaths were based on their knowledge of the de-
fendant, rather than actual circumstances. These must however have played a part in
practice.132 The oath taking constituted a very strict ritual. All the compurgators had
to take ‘the same oath’, in the ‘same terms’, and they also had to be unanimous.
Moreover, if half of the compurgators failed to take the oath ‘correctly’, the entire
oath was seen as invalid.133
The number of compurgators required depended on the seriousness of the mat-
ter. In less serious cases, the accused could defend her/himself purely through his/her
own oath. However, in most cases two, five, or eleven compurgators were needed,
i.e. three, six, or twelve people, together with the accused. The twelve-fold oath was
used for cases of murder and treason, while the six-fold oath was recommended for
e.g. theft of at least one ørtog. The three-fold oath seems to have been the one most
commonly used.134 Thus, a person who needed to defend her/himself was in most
cases dependent on having a number of people who could support the statement.
The oath of an individual was not seen to suffice.
For certain crimes, such as some types of murder, sorcery, and homosexual sex,
oath-taking was not accepted. In these cases, the defendant should show her/his in-
nocence by ordeal, such as carrying hot iron.135 This also applied to people who
could not find any witnesses or any compurgators.136 In the ordeal, the outcome was
seen to be decided by God himself. This was thus one of the few occasions when a
person’s fate was not decided by a group of people.137 Moreover, a person who did
not have a network of people who could act as compurgators, was on her/his own in
the judicial system.
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Final conclusions
This article has demonstrated that strong communal elements were present in the
earliest laws, particularly in the Law of the Gulathing. Until the late thirteenth cen-
tury, legal decisions and verdicts were settled through the cooperation of large num-
bers of people. A striking feature in the Law of the Gulathing is the absence of a
desire to find one guilty party. In the Law of the Frostathing, and particularly in the
Law of King Magnus Lagabøter, the aim is to find one guilty party. This develop-
ment was most likely the result of Christian influence, as individuals were now seen
to be responsible for their own actions. Indeed, in the Law of King Magnus
Lagabøter, the degree of punishment was at times decided according to intention be-
hind the crime and the disposition of the guilty party.138
The changes that took place over time can be further demonstrated by the no-
ticeable differences between the regulations discussed in this article and the eccle-
siastical regulations (kristinn réttr) in the laws of the Gula and the Frostathing. The
latter ones do not contain any cases of communal guilt or punishment, indeed pun-
ishments were at times constituted by personal penance.139 It is clear that many of
the regulations in the other sections of the laws were derived from old customary law,
and were only gradually changed to fit a Christian society.
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Sammandrag
Artikeln behandlar de många kollektiva aspekterna av rättsystemet i det tidigme-
deltida Norge. Undersökningen har baserats på tre av de tidigaste norska lagarna:
Gulatingslagen, Frostatingslagen samt Kung Magnus Lagaböters landslag. Dessa
lagar representerar olika tidsfaser och visar därmed hur rättsystemet förändrades.
De kollektiva aspekterna är starkast i Gulatingslagen och blir gradvis svagare i de två
senare lagarna.
Det är viktigt att lyfta fram lagarnas kollektiva drag eftersom tidigare forskning
om landskapslagarna till stor del har fokuserat på de regler som rör individen. An-
ledningen till detta var att man ville visa hur det medeltida samhället skilde sig från
det kollektiva förhistoriska, vilket har resulterat i att de många kollektiva dragen i la-
garna har ignorerats.
I artikelns inledning förklaras konceptet om “allmän kännedom”, en av grundste-
narna i tidig skandinavisk lag. Detta innebar att alla juridiska ärenden skulle offent-
liggöras. Vid exempelvis mord eller misshandel skulle den skyldiga kungöra sin
gärning. Den utsatta måste också kungöra handlingen som ett brott gentemot sig.
Samma princip gällde uppgörelser av olika slag; dessa skulle träffas i vittnens närvaro.
Om parterna senare blev oense om termerna i överenskommelsen kunde vittnena kal-
las in. Den äldsta varianten som beskrivs i Gulatingslagen var en mycket komplicerad
Collegium Medievale 2006
62 Alexandra Sanmark
procedur som krävde ett stort antal vittnen. Med tiden minskades emellertid antalet
vittnen till två, vilket kan ses som en utveckling mot ett samhälle mer inriktat på indi-
viden.
En av konsekvenserna av konceptet om allmän känndom var att alla överens-
kommelser blev offentliga och på så vis allas egendom. En annan var att brott som
begicks i det fördolda, som t.ex inbrott, räknades bland de grövsta brotten man kunde
begå. Något som ytterligare bidrog till den allmänna känndomen om gärningar och
överenskommelser var att det inte fanns någon ordningsmakt. Istället var befolk-
ningen förpliktigad att hjälpa till, exempelvis med att assistera biskopens män vid bö-
tesindrivning.
I de tidigaste lagarna tillämpades både kollektiv skuld och kollektiv bestraff-
ning. Som exempel kan Gulatingslagens regler om mord på en ölfest ges. Enligt
lagen var alla närvarande förpliktigade att hitta den skyldiga. Om de inte lyckades,
var de förpliktigade att betala full ersättning till den dödas släkt samt till kungen.
Med tiden togs detta bort och i Frostatingslagen var det istället arvtagarens ansvar
att anklaga den skyldiga. Man blev man alltså mer och mer inriktad på att hitta en
enda person som kunde hållas ansvarig för brottet. Detta orsakades troligtvis av kris-
tendomens inflytande. I de tidigaste lagarna tillämpades även kollektiv bestraffning,
exempelvis gatlopp, där befolkningen fick kasta sten på den som dömts av tinget.
En annan kollektiv aspekt var själva tingsförhandlingarna. Ända fram till slutet av
1200-talet togs rättsliga beslut gemensamt av ett stort antal människor. De lokala och
regionala tingsmötena var allting, dvs. alla fria män var förpliktigade att närvara och
skulle tillsammans enas om domen. För att den skulle få största möjliga genomslag
var det viktigt att få så många som möjligt att komma överens. Till den högsta in-
stansen, lagtinget, utvaldes ett antal lagtingsmän. Enligt den äldsta versionen av Gu-
latingslagen skulle det finnas 400 lagtingsmän. Antalet minskades med tiden och i
Magnus Lagaböters landslag var antalet nere i 148. Enligt samma lag var det sedan
36 lögréttumenn som skulle enas om domen. Resten av lagtingsmännen skulle en-
bart godkänna domen genom att skramla med sina vapen (vápnatak). Det är oklart om
det fanns lögréttumenn i de tidigare lagarna. Det är alltså möjligt att domarna i det ti-
digaste skedet skulle fastställas av samtliga 400 lagtingsmän.
Det är naturligtvis svårt att veta om domar och beslut var kollektiva även i prak-
tiken, eller om kungens män (dvs. årmän, lendmän och sysslomän) påverkade tings-
förhandlingarna. Detta verkar dock inte ha varit fallet. Kungens män hade vissa
formella förpliktelser i samband med tinget, men var förbjudna att delta i själva tings-
besluten. Det verkar alltså som om bönderna hade en ganska stark position i det ti-
digaste skedet. Detta verkar dock ha förändrats i och med lagmannens ökade
inflytande. I tidig medeltid skulle lagmannen enbart läsa upp lagen och ge órskurðr,
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dvs. förklara hur lagen förhöll sig till de fall som tagits upp på tinget. Med tiden blev
lagmannen en kungens man och hans órskurðr fick gradvis karaktären av en dom.
På 1260-talet hade lagmannen blivit en erkänd domare.
En annan viktig utveckling var införandet av sáttmál. Detta innebar att fall där la-
gens hållning var klar kunde avgöras direkt av kungens eller biskopens män, utan att
ett tingsmöte behövde kallas. Dessa män blev alltså i praktiken domare. Det verkar
som om kungen började stödja denna praxis från slutet av 1200-talet. Enligt Magnus
Lagaböters landslag kunde kungen dessutom bryta lagmannens órskurðr. Utveck-
lingen mot ett rättsystem mer fokuserat på individen kan även tydliggöras genom en
jämförelse med kristenrätterna. Dessa innehåller inga förordningar om kollektiv skuld
eller bestraffning. Straffen kunde ofta utgöras av personlig botgöring. Det står såle-
des klart att många av reglerna i de andra kapitlen av landskapslagarna kom från sed-
vanerätten, och bara gradvis förändrades för att passa det kristna samhället.
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